Week 12 - reflection paper Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Week 12 - reflection paper - Essay Example Another lesson I learnt is the need of engaging all the stakeholders of an organization into the management of its affairs. This is because it is important to collaborate in order to ensure that the policies of the organization are met. These stakeholders are the investors, the employees, partners of the organization, and regular clients of the organization. Due to this, I managed to acquire skills that gave me the capability to open a decorative company. For instance, my role in the formation of the company was to conduct market research, and identify the various needs of customers in relation to decorating their homes. In the formation of this company, I realized the need of consultations with my fellow investors for purposes of developing a policy that would effectively address the needs of the customers that I interviewed. On this basis therefore, I would give myself grade A. This is because I managed to apply the lessons I learnt from class, by forming a

Contract Law 2014-2015 Assesment problem with case history I will Essay

Contract Law 2014-2015 Assesment problem with case history I will supply case history as a word document - Essay Example The common law has 3 basic fundamentals in making of a contract namely agreement, contractual intention and consideration. Agreement as an essential of the basic law means that the parties ought to come to a legal agreement. Basically, an agreement can only be met when one party presents an offer, when this offer gets accepted by the other party, it becomes an agreement. The courts apply an objective test to determine whether the parties have arrived at an agreement. In the case study, when Brian decides to purchase the phone at EverEager, he and the company come to an agreement that he would pay a once-a-month payment direct deduction of  £35 for a period of one year1. In contract law, an offer is the willingness of a party on a contact on the specific terms. The offer is made with the objective that it should serve as the binding role once it gets accepted by the individual to whom it’s addressed. An offer can be directed to a single person or to a specific group of individuals. The Brian vs. EverEager is based on a single person. An offer is usually made by either words or by conduct. In the case study, Brian is handed the document by the assistant of the mobile phone company EverEager, he goes through it and signs. This offer is done by written words. An acceptance refers to the final and absolute expression of agreement to the terms and conditions of the offer. In this case there ought to be an objective expression, by the receiver of the offer, of a will to be bound by the terms. Acceptance of an offer has no lawful effect unless it gets communicated to the offerer. The general rule of contract law is that a postal appearance is effective only when the letter of acceptance gets accepted. If acceptance takes place through an immediate medium such as email, it will effective at the period and place of receipt. It is also vital to note that an offerer cannot instruct that the offerers silence aggregates

History of Typography Essay Example for Free

History of Typography Essay First of all, what is typography? Typography is the art of letter forms being organized into certain words or sentences. Typography came from the Greek word typos which means form and graphe which means writing. Most people would agree that a German man named Johannes Guttenberg was the one who invented typography. Before Guttenberg, everything had to be scribed by hand which was very time consuming. Guttenberg also created blackletter, the first ever typeface. Since blackletter looked very compact, a man named Nicolas Jensen invented the first ever Roman typeface during the 15th century. Since Jensen’s typeface was made of straight lines and regular curves, it was easier to be read compared to the blackletter typeface. After Roman letters, the italics typeface was created during the late 15th century by Aldus Manutius. During the 18th century, a man named William Caslon created a typeface called Old Style. A few decades later, John Baskerville created a variety of typeface which is now called Transitional. A few years later, a French man named Didot and an Italian man named Bodoni created typefaces that are classified as Modern. During the second industrial revolution, advertising needed new typefaces. Letters got taller, wider, and even weirder. Since the typefaces during the 19th century were so complex, the early 20th century brought something simple. A man named Paul Renner from Germany created a typeface called Futura which was based on simple geometric shapes. In 1957, Helvetica was introduced. Some would call this the world’s most favorite typeface. The world of typography changed with the introduction of the computer – and it will continue improving since technology is constantly improving too.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the Person Centred Therapy

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the Person Centred Therapy Since the late 20th century, psychotherapy has been described as an important aspect in the study of psychology. Due to its importance, psychologists have been actively involved in the identification of the critical approaches in counselling and psychotherapy (Corey 2009). Psychologists have come up with different theoretical models of counselling that are applicable at different situations during psychotherapy (Fall Holden 2010). The application of these theoretical models of counselling have helped in overcoming the impact of several emotional as well as psychological difficulties such as stress, depression, anxiety, anger, and other emotional problems (Fall Holden 2010). However, despite the universal application in solving similar problems in human beings, these theoretical models of psychotherapy possess distinct differences as well as similarities. A comparison and contrast of the major theoretical models in counselling is therefore critical in understanding the application o f each theory in psychotherapy (Corey 2009). This paper compares and contrasts three theoretical models of counselling. For comparison and contrasting purposes, the paper has identified three main modalities: Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, the Person-Centred Therapy, and Gestalt Therapy. This paper will describe the underpinning assumptions of each model, the goals of therapy in relation to each model, the therapeutic relationship including the role of the counsellor and the client, the key techniques of each model and the major limitations in relation to each particular model. The paper will describe each theoretical model of counselling while comparing and contrasting with the others utilizing the aforementioned aspects. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), Person-Centred Therapy, and Gestalt Therapy CBT, Person Centred Therapy and Gestalt Therapies are three theoretical models that have been applied in psychotherapy for many years. Despite their similarities and use in counselling, the three theoretical models hold distinct differences from each other. These differences are realized especially in regard to the assumptions, the goals of each, therapeutic relationship, key techniques of each and limitations (Corey 2009). Being one of the most preferred theoretical models in counselling, CBT has demonstrated explicit justifications as well as definite rates of success in most of the instances where it has been applied (Brewin 1989). The diversity of its applications in major psychological and emotional problems has also encouraged most psychotherapists to utilize it in therapeutical sessions (Stallard 2002). In contemporary psychotherapy, as described by Stallard (2002), CBT has been integrated with other theoretical models due to its multidimensional nature. CBT has been applied in clinical psychology and other psychological therapies on the basis of its premise of the importance of thinking about individual actions and feelings in relation to psychological and emotional health (Fall Holden 2010; Ingram Siegle 2000). Person-Centered Therapy was developed by Carl Rogers in the 1940s, and has been a critical theoretical model in counselling. According to Fall Holden (2010), this theory of counselling developed in three different phases. In the first phase, the theory focused on how the nondirective counsellors conduct differed from that of more directive psychotherapists such as psychoanalysts and behaviour therapists (Fall Holden 2010, p 171). The second phase focused away from the counsellor and firmly onto the client as a responsible agent whose nature provided the rationale for the counsellors therapeutic conduct (Fall Holden 2010, p 171).The third phase emerged when the theory included past counselling philosophies which formed major requirements of conventional psychology (Vacc Loesch 2000). Gestalt Therapy, on the other hand, emerged in the 20th century. As described by Fall Holden (2010), Gestalt therapy grew from a reaction to classical psychoanalysis that permeated the psychological community of the early twentieth century (p. 201). Developed in the 1940s by Frederick Fritz Perls, Gestalt Therapy focused on cultivating growth rather than pathological remediation, (Fall Holden 2010, p 202). Actual psychological experiences are the major emphasis of the gestalt therapy. Underpinning Assumptions Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), Person-Centred Therapy and Gestalt Therapy have differing underpinning assumptions that make each therapy distinct. CBT assumes that the occurrence of behavioural and emotional problems in most individuals is due to the nature of people incorporating faulty thinking (Dryden Bond 2000). CBT also assumes that the manner in which individuals perform and believe is determined and influenced by individual cognition. The counselling is therefore focused towards the cognition and behaviour of the individual (Ingram Siegle 2000). During CBT, the importance of decision making, thought, questioning and action is stressed. CBT assumes that counselling is a process that entails learning, acquisition of novel talents as well as learning new coping mechanisms for common psychological and emotional problems (Corey 2009, Stallard 2002). In person centred therapy, it is assumed that humans are positive and due to this positivity, they tend to be inclined towards the achievement of complete functionality of both their bodies and minds (VanKalmthout 1998). In applying this model in counselling, it is assumed that the immediate experiences in an individual have occurred due to lack of past awareness about the problems. The theory has it that after therapy, the individual will possess actualization that will impact on his or her potential to move from being unaware to being aware of his or her feelings, and will have self trust and think positively in relation to his or her life (Rennie 1998). Gestalt Therapy assumes that for an individual to achieve personal wholeness in terms of thinking, feelings as well as behaviour, they have to work hard (Brownell 2010). This theory assumes that if an individual is allowed to flashback on past experiences, they will be able to relate them to the present experiences and then connect the two. Fall Holden (2010) claim this model of counselling utilizes an experiential advance that holds its grounds on the immediate experiences therefore emphasizing on individual responsibilities as well as choices. Goals of Therapy The three theoretical models possess different goals. CBT challenges individuals to face the behaviours, norms, and beliefs that affect their psychological and emotional health (Dryden Bond 2000). CBT also encourages clients to be more aware of their thoughts therefore encouraging clients to change their feelings (Vacc Loesch 2000). Person-Centred therapy aims at providing individuals with an environment that is safe and favourable for exploring their well being (Rennie 1998). By encouraging clients to explore well being, Person-centred therapy ensures that clients recognize all the challenges that they have faced in their emotional and psychological growth. Further, this therapy enables clients to realise aspects of self worthiness that had been imprecise during their past (Tudor Worrall 2006). The goals of the Gestalt Therapy also differ from those of CBT and person centred therapies. Basically, Gestalt therapy aims at assisting emotionally and psychologically affected individuals in advancing towards self awareness in relation to their day to day experiences (Brownell 2010). This encourages clients to be expansive especially in making choices in regard to their lives. However, the gestalt therapy in contrast with the CBT and person-centred therapies aims at assimilation but not at psychoanalysis which is common in the other two therapies (Fall Holden 2010). Therapeutic Relationship In relation to therapeutic relationship, the role of the counsellor and client becomes critical in ensuring that the outcome of the therapy is desirable. In relation to the three theoretical models of counselling under discussion, the therapeutic relationships differ from one model to the other. In each model, the client and therapist hold different roles (Corey 2009). The therapeutic relationship in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, the therapeutic relationship resembles the relationship between a teacher and a student. The therapist acts as the teacher and the client as the student. According to Romana (2003), the role of the therapist is to give therapeutical instructions to the client who listens and does what the counsellor says. In this relationship, the counsellor employs directive structures to direct clients on behaviour changes (Dryden Bond 2000). In this case, the counsellor acts as the focal point since he impacts much on the cognitive and behavioural changes in the client. However, for desirable results, collaboration is ensured during therapy (Gilbert Leahy 2007). The counsellor utilizes the Socratic dialogue that is critical in supporting clients in tenets such as the identification of the beliefs, norms and values that have impacted on the psychological and emotional functionality (Romana 2003). Further, the counsellor encourages the client to change these beliefs as well as identify an unconventional rule for present and future living. In this case, the counsellor helps in promoting the adoption of remedial skills of learning (DeRubeis, Tang Beck 2001). In this relationship, the client always gets new insights in relation to the problems he/she is experiencing and therefore decides on efficient and effective means of acquiring change (Gilbert Leahy 2007). In the person centred therapy, the therapeutic relationship is distinct from CBT and gestalt. In Person-Centred Therapy, the relationship between client and counsellor is crucial (Tudor Worrall 2006) because therapy is centred towards the client as the client is the focal point of the therapy. Due to this, the counsellor must ensure that respect, genuineness, and empathy towards the client are maintained. Further, communication is also critical in this model especially between the client and the therapist. The relationship must equal as it is crucial in aiding behaviour change in the client (Wilkins 2010). Therapeutic relationships in the Gestalt Therapy hold central significance. The counsellor and client establish a relationship that is centrally placed. In this therapy, the relationship only depends on the nature and quality of the therapeutic measures being given (Brownell 2010). In contrast to CBT and person centred therapies, gestalt therapy depends much on the attitudes of the counsellor towards the client. The client is his own interpreter hence the counsellor only helps the client to interpret his behaviours and experiences (Brownell 2010). Therefore the role of the counsellor is as an aid. The client identifies his experiences and works on how to change the experiences that affect his current psychological and emotional health (Fall Holden 2010). Key Techniques There are different techniques applicable in the three models of counselling described in this paper. CBT utilizes techniques aimed at personal counselling. The theory utilizes the Socratic model that entails several questions to be answered by the client. Corey (2009) denotes that therapists utilize a variety of cognitive, emotive, and behavioural techniques; diverse methods are tailored to suit individual clients, (p. 466). However, the client is also allowed to ask the counsellor some questions. Further, the theory employs the aspect of homework that encourages the clients to practice the skills learnt. Therefore the major technique of CBT is the ABC technique that utilizes the Socratic model (DeRubeis, Tang Beck 2001). In client centred therapy, the techniques differ from those of CBT. While CBT applies assignments and Socratic model, Person centred therapy makes use of the attitudes of the counsellor as the major technique. The attitude of the counsellor towards the client dete rmines the outcome of the therapy (Tudor Worrall 2006). However, this therapy utilizes aspects of hearing and listening and clarification of ideas and feelings. This therapy does not utilize techniques that entail directive aspects. In person centred therapy, there is no probing and questioning; common aspects in CBT therapy (Wilkins 2010). In the Gestalt therapy, the techniques used contrast those of CBT and person-centred therapy. As asserted by Corey (2009), this therapy uses a wide range of experiments designed to intensify experiencing and to integrate conflicting feelings, (p. 466). Limitations Though the theoretical models of counselling described in this paper are necessary in counselling, each model has several limitations. The CBT is believed to have an aspect of playing down the emotions of the clients. It lacks the focus on determining the underlying unconsciousness in the clients and due to this fails in relating the clients past with the present experiences. Since it entails confrontation, this therapy may witness cases of termination as most clients may not cope with its expectations (Fall Holden 2010). The limitations of the person centred therapy are distinct as compared to those of CBT and Gestalt. Since the therapist is a passive entity during this therapy, cases of limited responses are occasional. There is lack of direction for most clients since the counsellor remains inactive (Wilkins 2010). In cases when crisis occurs, the clients will lack support. The theory lacks the application of novel knowledge hence cases of rigidity are common (Tudor Worrall 2006 ). In Gestalt Therapy, limitations include expressions of emotion due to the techniques that are employed. Clients in most cases fail to acquire or reach the required thresholds of the therapy since cognitive aspects are not dealt with. Conclusion This paper has described three theoretical models including CBT, Person-Centred and Gestalt. The paper has explored the underpinning assumptions of each model while comparing and contrasting the assumptions. It has also identified the goals of each therapy as well as the therapeutic relationships. The paper has also compared and contrasted the key techniques utilized in the three models as well as the limitations of each model. Although it is established that each of the three models is distinct from the other in terms of the described concepts, the three theoretical models are critical in psychotherapy.

Multiple Regression :: Gender

Introduction For this study researchers were interested in assessing whether self-reported health behaviours and health literacy are able to predict self-rated physical health, after controlling for the effects of gender and age. They are further interested in knowing which of the variables provide a statistically significant contribution to the equation. Also of interest to the researches was the interaction between gender and health literacy, that is, the degree to which individuals are able to obtain, process and understand the information needed to make appropriate decisions about their health, and the impact of this interaction on health. Data was collected from 350 people randomly selected from a dataset from a population-based study of health and health determinants. Health was measured on a scale of 1 to 10, where higher scores represent better health. Health behaviours include healthy diet, physical activity and relaxation and are measured on a scale from 1 to 15. Health literacy is measured on a scale from 10 to 45. Gender and age in years were also collected from the respondents. Data Screening & Assumption Testing The initial step in this data analysis involved screening the data for possible missing values, out of range values, univariate and multivariate outliers and multicollinearity. Three variables used for this study contained missing values; both system and identified missing. These variables were health literacy, physical activity and age in years, one case for each of these variables. Each of these missing values were recoded with a missing value code of 999. Descriptive statistics produced for each of the variables used for the analysis revealed out of range values for the variables healthy diet, physical activity and relaxation. These values were also recoded to the missing value code 999. Testing for the presence of outliers was done by generating a scatterplot matrix for all variables (Figure 1), and plots of Cook’s distances (Figure 2) and Mahalanobis distances (Figure 3). There are no cases which indicate a particular cause for concern. On the Mahalanobis distance chart there are no cases that is substantially larger than the rest and on the Cook’s distance there is no case with a distance above 1 which would indicate an influential point. Multicollinearity was tested and there were no variables with a tolerance of less than 0.3. It is also necessary to check the regression assumptions to ensure that any results from analysis are valid. The first assumption is that all variables are measured on a metric scale or that categorical variables are dichotomously coded. This is true for the data in this study. The second assumption is that each observation in the sample is independent of the other observations, the

Portrait Of A Man Trying To Hang On :: Essays Papers

Portrait Of A Man Trying To Hang On Wade Whitehouse is a man who is frightened to death of following in his father's footsteps, yet he follows them exactly. His violent temper and alcoholism are giant neon signs of how much he is like his father Glen and how closely related their actions are. Wade and his brother Rolfe lived with a violent and destructive man whose behavior was both mentally and physically threatening to his sons. Their father had successfully destroyed them in a long process that began when they were young boys, as they stood and watched him strike their mother. These boys grew up with only feelings of fear and loathing toward their father. Rolfe is the son who in a sense escapes and tells this story as the narrator. Wade, on the other hand, is captured by the violence and alcoholism and acts in the same manners as his father before him. Wade and his father anesthetize their pain through alcoholism which Rolfe manages to just barely escape. We see Wade as a drunk, abusive, and overall sad father, ex-husband and sheriff who has lost control of his life. He is a very complex character from a small town that becomes mentally ill as time goes by. Is this due to his alcoholism? Does everything stem from his alcoholism and the fact that his father was mentally and physically abusive to both him and his brother? Is alcoholism Wade’s affliction? Or is it the devastating and lingering effects of the child abuse he grew up with? There are many things in Wade’s life that might have driven him to become an alcoholic. For example his actions have cost him his marriage to Lillian, his daughter Jill doesn’t want to live with him, he is a sheriff in a small town with little crime, his mother dies and his father is hard to cope with in his old age, and his girlfriend Margie only stands by him until finally she too has had enough. These seem like common occurrences in the life of many Americans today, yet these are the things that lead people to alcoholism. Wade is being held down by more baggage than most have. In a quest to assert himself, Wade strikes out against those who are most important in his life and is faced with the disrespect of the town.

Economic Interdependence

Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations Author(s): Dale C. Copeland Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 5-41 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/2539041 Accessed: 12/10/2010 13:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=mitpress.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email  protected] org.The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www. jstor. org Economic DaleC. Copeland Interdependence and War A Theory of Trade Expectations Does economic inter- dependence increase or decrease the probability of war among states? With the Cold War over, this question is taking on importance as trade levels between established powers such as the United States and Russia and emerging powers such as Japan, China, and Western Europe grow to new heights.In this article, I provide a new dynamic theory to help overcome some of the theoretical and empirical problems with current liberal and realist views on the question. The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities. Economic interdependence is the only factor that plays an important causal role in the thinking of both camps, and their perspectives are diametrically opposed. Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression: interdependent states would rather trade than invade. As long as high levels of Dale C. Copelands AssistantProfessorn the Department f Governmentnd ForeignAffairsat the i i o a University f Virginia. oFor their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article, I w ould like to thank Robert Art, V. Natasha Copeland, Michael Desch, Angela Doll, John Duffield, Matthew Evangelista, Richard Falkenrath, James Fearon, Joseph Grieco, Atsushi Ishida, Irving Lachow, Alastair lain Johnston, Andrew Kydd, Jack Levy, Lisa Martin, Michael Mastanduno, John Mearsheimer, Andrew Moravcsik, John Owen, Paul Papayoanou, Stephen Rhoads, Gideon Rose, Richard Rosecrance, Len Schoppa, Herman Schwartz, Randall Schweller, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, David Waldner, and Stephen Walt.This article also benefited from presentations at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security at the University of Chicago; the University of Virginia Department of Government's faculty workshop; the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995; the Olin security workshop at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; and the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (under whose auspices it was written). A ll errors remain mine. 1.For a summary of the causal variables in the two schools, see John J. Mearsheimer, â€Å"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,†InternationalSecurity, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Robert 0. Keohane, â€Å"International Liberalism Reconsidered,† in John Dunn, ed. , The EconomicLimits to ModernPolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 165-194. InternationalSecurity, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41 ? 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 6 interdependence can be maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism. Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security. Accordingly, interdependence-meaning mutual dependence and thus vulnerability-gives states an i ncentive to initiate war, if only to ensure continued access to necessary materials and goods.The unsatisfactory nature of both liberal and realist theories is shown by their difficulties in explaining the run-ups to the two World Wars. The period up to World War I exposes a glaring anomaly for liberal theory: the European powers had reached unprecedented levels of trade, yet that did not prevent them from going to war. Realists certainly have the correlation right-the war was preceded by high interdependence-but trade levels had been high for the previous thirty years; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient.At first glance, the period from 1920 to 1940 seems to support liberalism over realism. In the 1920s, interdependence was high, and the world was essentially peaceful; in the 1930s, as entrenched protectionism caused interdependence to fall, international tension rose to the point of world war. Yet the two most aggressive stat es in the system during the 1930s, Germany and Japan, were also the most highly dependent despite their efforts towards autarchy, relying on other states, including other great powers, for critical raw materials.Realism thus seems correct in arguing that high dependence may lead to conflict, as states use war to ensure access to vital goods. Realism's problem with the interwar era, however, is that Germany and Japan had been even more dependent in the 1920s, yet they sought war only in the late 1930s when their dependence, although still significant, had fallen. The theory presented in this article-the theory of trade expectations-helps to resolve these problems.The theory starts by clarifying the notion of economic interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to avoid war with the realist view that the potential costs of being cut off can push states to war to secure vital goods. The total of the benefits and potential costs of tra de versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of adjusting its economy to the new situation.Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war. This supplements the static Economicnterdependence War| 7 and I consideration in liberalism and realism of the levels of interdependence at any point in time, with the importance of leaders' dynamic expectations into the future. Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions.Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future. If highly interdependent states expect that trade will be severely restric ted-that is, if their expectations for future trade are low-realists are likely to be right: the most highly dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war, for fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their long-term security. In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade.This dynamic perspective helps bridge the gaps within and between current approaches. Separating levels of interdependence from expectations of future trade indicates that states may be pushed into war even if current trade levels are high, if leaders have good reason to suspect that others will cut them off in the future. In such a situation, the expected value of trade will likely be negative, and hence the value of continued peace is also negative, making war an attractive alternative.This insight helps resolve the liberal problem with World War I: despite high trade levels in 1913-14, declining expectations for future trade pushed German leaders to attack, to ensure long-term access to markets and raw materials. Even when current trade is low or non-existent, positive expectations for future trade will produce a positive expected value for trade, and therefore an incentive for continued peace. This helps explain the two main periods of detente between the Cold War superpowers, from 1971 to 1973 and in the late 1980s: positive signs from U. S. eaders that trade would soon be significantly increased coaxed the Soviets into a more cooperative relationship, reducing the probability of war. But in situations of low trade where there is no prospect that high trade levels will be restored in the future, highly dependent states may be pushed into conflict. This was the German and Japanese dilemma before World War II. The article is divided into three sections. The first section reviews liberal and realist theories on the relationship between economic interdependence and the probability of war, and provides a critique of both theories.The second section lays out trade expectations theory The final section examines the diplomatic historical evidence for the new theory against two significant cases: Germany Internationalecurity20:4 | 8 S before World War I and Germany before World War II. The evidence indicates that the new variable, expectations of future trade, helps resolve the anomalies for current theories: in both cases, negative expectations for future trade, combined with high dependence, led leaders into total war out of fear for their long-term economic position and therefore security.TheLiberal nd RealistDebateon Economic nterdependence a I War and The core liberal position is straightforward. 2 Trade provides valuable benefits, or â€Å"gains from trade,† to any particular state. A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than w ar, so dependent states should prefer to trade not invade. This argument is often supported by the auxiliary proposition that modern technology greatly increases the costs and risks of aggression, making the trading option even more rational.The argument was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden, who asserted that free trade â€Å"unites† states, â€Å"making each equally anxious for the prosperity and happiness of both. â€Å"3 This view was restated in The GreatIllusion by Norman Angell just prior to World War I and again in 1933. Angell saw states having to choose between new ways of thinking, namely peaceful trade, and the â€Å"old method† of power politics. Even if war was once profitable, modernization now makes it impossible to â€Å"enrich† oneself through force; indeed, by destroying trading bonds, war is â€Å"commercially suicidal. 4 Why do wars nevertheless occur? While the start of World War I just after The GreatIllusion's initial p ublication might seem to refute his thesis, Angell in 2. Four other subsidiary liberal arguments, employing intervening variables, are not sufficiently compelling to discuss here. The first suggests that high trade levels promote domestic prosperity, thereby lessening the internal problems that push leaders into war. The second argues that interdependence helps to foster increased understanding between peoples, which reduces the misunderstandings that lead to war.The third asserts that trade alters the domestic structure of states, heightening the influence of groups with a vested interest in peaceful trade. The final argument contends that trade has the â€Å"spill-over† effect of increasing political ties between trading partners, thus improving the prospects for long-term cooperation. For an critical analysis of these views, see Dale Copeland, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War,†paper presented to University of Virginia Department of Government's faculty workshop, March 1995. 3. Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London: T.Fischer Unwin, 1903), p. 225. 4. Norman Angell, The GreatIllusion, 2d ed. (New York: G. P Putnam's Sons, 1933), pp. 33, 59-60, 87-89. Economicnterdependence WarI 9 I and the 1933 edition argued that the debacle simply confirmed the unprofitability of modern wars. He thus upheld the common liberal view that wars, especially major wars, result from the misperceptions of leaders caught up in the outmoded belief that war still pays. Accordingly, his is â€Å"not a plea for the impossibility of war †¦ but for its futility,† since â€Å"our ignorance on this matter makes war not only possible, but extremely likely. 5 In short, if leaders fail to see how unprofitable war is compared to the benefits of trade, they may still erroneously choose the former. Richard Rosecrance provides the most extensive update of the CobdenAngell thesis to the nuclear era. States must choose betwe en being â€Å"trading states,† concerned with promoting wealth through commerce, and â€Å"territorial states,† obsessed with military expansion. Modern conditions push states towards a predominantly trading mode: wars are not only too costly, but with the peaceful trading option, â€Å"the benefits that one nation gains from trade can also be realized by others. When the system is highly interdependent, therefore, the â€Å"incentive to wage war is absent,† since â€Å"trading states recognize that they can do better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land. â€Å"6 Rosecrance thus neatly summarizes the liberal view that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading. 7 5. Ibid. , pp. 59-62, 256. i S a 6. RichardRosecrance,TheRise of the Trading tate:Commercend Conquestn the ModernWorld (New York: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 3-14; 24-25 (emphasis added); see also Rosecrance, â€Å"War, a Trade and Interdependence,† in James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp, eds. , Interdependence nd Conflict in WorldPolitics (Aldershot, U. K. : Avebury, 1989), pp. 48-57; Rosecrance, â€Å"A New Concert of Powers,† Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82. 7. A book often seen as a statement on the peace-inducing effects of interdependence-Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)-actually contains no such causal argument. For Keohane and Nye, â€Å"complex interdependence† is more peaceful by definition: it is a valuable concept for analyzing the political process† only when military force is â€Å"unthinkable† (pp. 29, 24). In the second edition: â€Å"since we define complex interdependence in terms of [policy] goals and instruments,† arguments â€Å"about how goals and instruments are affected by th e degree to which a situation approximates complex interdependence or realism will be tautological. † Thus, â€Å"we are left essentially with two dependent variables: changes in agendas and changes in the roles of international organizations. † Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, d ed. (Glenview, Ill. Scott, Foresman, 1989), p. 255; emphasis in original. 2 The dependent variable of this article-the likelihood of war-is nowhere to be found, which is not surprising, since it is assumed away. Other works on interdependence from the 1970s, which largely examined dependent variables other than war, are discussed in Copeland, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War. † InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 10 Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war. States concerned about security will dislike dependence, since it means that crucial i mported goods could be cut off during a crisis. This problem is particularly acute for imports like oil and raw materials; while they may be only a small percentage of the total import bill, without them most modern economies would collapse. Consequently, states dependent on others for vital goods have an increased incentive to go to war to assure themselves of continued access of supply. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz puts the argument as follows: actors within a domestic polity have little reason to fear the dependence that goes with specialization.The anarchic structure of international politics, however, makes states worry about their vulnerability, thus compelling them â€Å"to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency. † For Waltz, it is this â€Å"simple thought† that explains, among other things, â€Å"their imperial thrusts to widen the scope of their control. â€Å"9 For John Mearsheimer, nations that â€Å"depend on others for crit ical economic supplies will fear cutoff or blackmail in time of crisis or war. † Consequently, â€Å"they may try to extend political control to the source of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers. Interdependence, therefore, â€Å"will probably lead to greater security competition. â€Å"10 8. One might contend that realists doubt the causal importance of economic interdependence, since relative gains concerns convince great powers to avoid becoming dependent in the first place. Aside from arguments showing why states may cooperate despite concerns for relative gains (see essays by Powell, Snidal, and Keohane in David A. Baldwin, ed. , Neorealismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary ebate [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993]; Dale Copeland, â€Å"Why Relative DGains Concerns May Promote Economic Cooperation: A Realist Explanation for Great Power Interdependence,† presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies A ssociation, San Diego, April 1996), the argument is empirically false. Periods of high interdependence have arisen even when the security competition between great powers was particularly intense, such as from 1880 to 1914, as Waltz acknowledges. Kenneth Waltz, â€Å"The Myth of Interdependence,† in Ray Maghoori and Bennett Ramberg, Globalism versus Realism (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1982), p. 83.Since the reality of high interdependence cannot be argued or assumed away, I focus here on the core realist claim that whenever high levels of interdependence are reached, for whatever reason, war is more likely. 9. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of InternationalPolitics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 106. 10. John J. Mearsheimer, â€Å"Disorder Restored,† in Graham Allison and Gregory F Treverton, eds. , Rethinking America's Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 223; Mearsheimer, â€Å"Back to the Future,† p. 45. See also Robert Gilpin, â€Å"Economic Interde pendence and National Security in Historical Perspective,† in Klaus Knorr and Frank N.Trager, eds. , Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kan. : Allen, 1977), p. 29. Adopting the realist argument, but emphasizing how dependence leads states to adopt destabilizing offensive strategies, is Anne Uchitel, â€Å"Interdepend- Economicnterdependence War| 11 and I This modern realist understanding of economic interdependence and war finds its roots in mercantilist writings dating from the seventeenth century Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power. For mercantilists, imperial expansionthe acquisition of colonies-is driven by the state's need to secure greater control over sources of supply and markets for its goods, and to build relative power in the process. By allowing the metropole and the colonies to specialize in production and trade of complementary products (particularly manufactured goods for raw materials), while ensuring political control over the process, colonies â€Å"opened up the possibility of providing a system of supply within a self-contained empire. â€Å"‘2 In this, we see the underpinning for the neorealist view that interdependence leads to war.Mercantilist imperialism represents a reaction to a state's dependence; states reduce their fears of external specialization by increasing internal specialization within a now larger political realm. The imperial state as it expands thus acquires more and more of the characteristics of Waltz's domestic polity, with its hierarchy of specialized functions secure from the unpredictable policies of others. In sum, realists seek to emphasize one main point: political concerns driven by anarchy must be injected into the liberal calculus.Since states must be primarily concerned with security and therefore with control over resources and markets, one must discount the liberal optimism that great trading partners will always continue to be great trading partners simply because both states benefit absolutely. Accordingly, a state vulnerable to another's policies because of dependence will tend to use force to overcome that vulnerability. ence and Instability,† in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds. , Coping with Complexityin the International System (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1993), pp. 43-264. For Barry Buzan, since liberal free-trading systems are dependent on a hegemon which invariably declines, such systems are destined to fall into â€Å"malevolent† mercantilist practices, as states scramble to control access to goods formerly safeguarded by the hegemon. Avoiding the liberal system altogether, through a â€Å"benign† mercantilist system of self-sufficient trading blocs, will be therefore preferred. Buzan, â€Å"Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,† International Organization, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), esp. pp . 597, 609-623. For a similar argument, see Robert Gilpin, U. S. Power and the Multinational Corporation(New York: Basic Books), 1975, p. 259. 11. See Eli F Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London: George Allen, 1931), p. 15; Jacob Viner, â€Å"Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,† World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 10; David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft(Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1985), chap. . 12. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, p. 40. InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 12 A COMPARISON OF THE LIBERAL AND REALIST PERSPECTIVES While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an individual state's decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term â€Å"interdependence,† both derive predictions from with their own specif ic how particular decision-making units-states-deal dependence.This allows both theories to handle situations of â€Å"asymmetric interdependence,† where one state in a dyad is more dependent than the other. Their predictions are internally consistent, but opposed: liberals argue that the more dependent state is less likely to initiate conflict, since it has more to lose from breaking economic ties;13 realists maintain that this state is more likely to initiate conflict, to escape its vulnerability. The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence.The realist argument highlights an aspect that is severely downplayed in the liberal argument, namely, consideration of the potential costs from the severing of a trading relationship. Most liberals, if pressed, would probably accept David Baldwin's conceptualization of dependence as the opportunity costs a state would experience should trade end. Yet Baldwin's opportunity costs are only the loss of the benefits from trade received after a state moves from autarchy. 14 It is this understanding of opportunity costs that is followed in the most comprehensive liberal argument for interdependence and peace, that of Rosecrance.There is little sense in Rosecrance's work that a state's decision to specialize and thus to restructure its economy radically can entail huge â€Å"costs of adjustment† should trade be later severed, nor that such costs can actually put the state in a far worse position than if it had never moved from autarchy in the first place. 15 This is the concern of realists when they talk about dependence on 13. See Keohane and Nye, â€Å"World Politics and the International Economic System,† in C. Fred Bergsten, ed. , The Future of the InternationalEconomicOrder (Lexington: D. C.Heath, 1973), pp. 121122; Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegley, â€Å"Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance,† International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 191-222. 14. David A. Baldwin, â€Å"Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,† International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 478, 482-484, 489; Baldwin, â€Å"The Power of Positive Sanctions,† WorldPolitics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19-38; Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade,exp. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), chap. . 15. On the costs of adjustment, see Ruth Arad, Seev Hirsch, and Alfred Tovias, The Economicsof Peacemaking(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 26-34. Keohane and Nye examine the â€Å"costs of adjusting† as an integral part of â€Å"vulnerability† interdependence (Power and Interdependence, p. 13). Yet they do not establish the original autarchic position as a baseline for examining these costs independently from the benefits of trade forgone; this baseline is incorporated later i n EconomicInterdependence nd War | 13 a â€Å"vital goods† such as oil.A state that chooses not to buy oil from outsiders forgoes certain benefits of trade, but by operating on domestic energy sources, it avoids the heavy penalty experienced by a state that does base its industrial structure on imported oil, only to find itself cut off from supplies. That Rosecrance minimizes this realist concern is evident. In an explicit effort to refute Waltz's definition of interdependence as â€Å"a trading link which ‘is costly to break',† Rosecrance contends that â€Å"to measure interdependence in this way misses the essence of the concept. His subsequent discussion emphasizes only the benefits that states give up if they choose not to trade (his â€Å"opportunity costs†), and makes no mention of any potentially severe costs of adjustment. In fact, he argues that dependence on such things as foreign sources of energy is really no different than relying on outsider s for â€Å"fashions† or different makes of cars; if trade is cut off, a state loses only â€Å"consumer choice. † Recognition that the whole industrial structure of a state might be undermined or destroyed by an adversary's severing of vital trade is absent. 6 Rosecrance is reluctant to acknowledge realist concerns, perhaps because to do so would imply that dependent states might be more willing to go to war, as realists maintain, while Rosecrance is arguing that they are less willing to do so. 17 This points to a critical distinction between liberalism and realism that illuminates the liberal understanding of why wars ultimately occur. For liberals, interdependence does not have a downside that might push states into war, as realists contend. Rather, interdependence is seen to operate as a restraint on aggressive tendencies arising from the domestic or individual levels.If interdependence becomes low, this restraint is taken away, allowing the aggressive tendencies t o dominate. To borrow a metaphor from Plato: for liberals, inter- building the new theory. Liberals also consider â€Å"costs† in terms of losses in â€Å"autonomy† due to trade ties; see Richard N. Cooper, The Economicsof Interdependence New York:McGraw Hill, 1968), ( pp. 4-12; Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, pp. 39-41, 235. Note, however, that these are costs that go hand in hand with high trade, not costs that are experienced if trade is cut off.Hence, these losses in autonomy are more accurately considered as a form of sensitivity interdependencecosts incurred when trade is ongoing-rather than as a form of â€Å"vulnerability† interdependence so worrying to realists. On this, see Keohane and Nye, â€Å"International Interdependence and Integration,† in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. , Handbook of Political Science, vol. 8 (Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 368-370. 16. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, pp. 144-145. In the appendix, an iterated prisoner's dilemma is used to show the â€Å"concrete benefits† from trade cooperation.If states decide not to cooperate, they simply â€Å"[do] not benefit†; pp. 233-236. 17. Rosecrance occasionally seems to accept that some goods are more vital than others, but even here he reiterates the liberal argument: â€Å"Countries dependent on the world economy for markets, assistance, and critical raw materials are doubly hesitant to embark on military adventures†; ibid. , p. 133, emphasis added. InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 14 dependence operates like the reins on the dark horse of inner passions; it provides a material incentive to stay at peace, even when there are internal predispositions towards aggression.Remove the reins, however, and these passions are free to roam as they will. 18 This point becomes clearer as one examines Rosecrance's explanations for the two World Wars. World War II, for Rosecrance, was ultimately domestically d riven. The main aggressors saw war as a means to cope with the upheavals flowing from â€Å"social discontent and chaos† and the â€Å"danger of left-wing revolutions†; given these upheavals, it is â€Å"not surprising that the territorial and military-political system [i. e. , war] emerged as an acceptable alternative to more than one state. Connecting the Second World War to causes arising from the unit level in the First World War,he continues: â€Å"If Germany, Italy, and Japan did not fulfill their territorial ambitions at the end of World War I, they might develop even more nationalistic and solidaristic regimes and try again. â€Å"19With trade and therefore interdependence at low levels in the 1930s, â€Å"economics offered no alternative possibility†; it failed to provide what he later refers to as a â€Å"mitigat[ing]† or â€Å"restraining† influence on unit-level motives for war. 0 World War I is a problematic case for Rosecrance, as it was for Angell, since the great powers went to war even though trade levels were still high. Like Angell, Rosecrance's main defense of liberalism is that leaders simply did not see how beneficial interdependence was, and how costly war would be. Due to outmoded ideas and unit-level pathologies, they misperceived the situation; hence, interdependence could not operate as it should, as a restraint on aggression. He talks about leaders' obsession with â€Å"nationalist ambitions† and â€Å"balance of power politics. He suggests that â€Å"no pre-1914 statesman or financier was fully aware of the damage that war would do to the European body economic† because of the irrational belief that â€Å"[war] would be over very 18. See Plato's Phaedrus in Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), sections 246-256. The historical roots of this view are explicated in f b i P Albert 0. Hirschman,The Passionsand the Interests: olitic alArgumentsor Capitalism efore ts Triumph(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).He quotes Montesquieu (ibid. , p. 73): â€Å"It is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though their passions may prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so. † 19. Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, pp. 102-103 (see also p. 111). Rosecrance does point out that Germany and Japan apparently went to war also to gain raw materials (ibid. , p. 108). He does not argue, however, that these two states were more dependent than other states for such materials; to have done so would suggest the validity of the realist logic. 0. See ibid. , pp. 106, 123, 150, 162. EconomicInterdependence nd War | 15 a quickly. â€Å"21At one point, he even seems to cast doubt on the efficacy of interdependence as a restraint on aggression: One should not place too much emphasis upon the existence of interdependence per se. European nations in 1913 relied upon the trade and investment that flowed between them; that did not prevent the political crisis which led to †¦ World War I. Interdependence only constrains national policy if leaders accept and agree to work within its limits. 22It thus appears that Rosecrance cannot really envision interdependence as being anything but a â€Å"constraint† or â€Å"restraint† on unit-level tendencies to aggress. This view is consistent with the general liberal perspective that all wars are ultimately driven by unit-level phenomena such as misperceptions, authoritarianism, ideology, and internal social conflict. Rosecrance's historical understanding of the World War II, for example, would fit nicely with the â€Å"democratic peace† literature: had all the states in 1939 been democratic, war would probably ot have occurred despite the disrupted global economic situation, but since some states were not democratic, their aggressive domestic forces became unfettered once interdependence had declined. The idea that economic factors by themselves can push states to aggress-an argument consistent with neorealism and the alternative theory I will present below-is outside the realm of liberal thought, since it would imply that purely systemic forces can be responsible for war, largely regardless of unit-level phenomena. 3 While liberal theory certainly downplays the realist concern for the potential costs of severed trade, it is also clear that realists slight the positive role the benefits of trade can have on a state's choice between peace and war. In the next section, I bring together the liberal emphasis on benefits with the realist emphasis on costs to create a framework for understanding the true level of dependence a state faces. This section also seeks to correct the most significant 21. See ibid. , pp. 18-19, 88, 96-97, 99, 150. 22. Ibid. , p. 141 (see also p. 150).The argument here borders on being non-falsifiable: disconfirming cases where war occurs despite hig h interdependence can be sidestepped by saying simply that states did not â€Å"accept† being peaceful traders. Note as well that if states have already decided to be peaceful, then interdependence is not needed as a restraint. 23. On liberalism's inherently unit-level orientation to conflict, see Andrew Moravcsik, â€Å"Liberalism and International Relations Theory,† Working Paper, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1992; Michael Howard, War and the LiberalConscience (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978).On the democratic peace argument, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 16 error in both liberal and realist theories, namely, their lack of theoretical attention to the dynamics of state expectations for the future. o Trade r Invade? A Theory f Trade xpectations E o This section introduces the theory of trade expectations.This theory extends liberal and realist views regarding interdependence and war, by synthesizing their strengths while formulating a dynamic perspective on state decision-making that is at best only implicit in current approaches. The strength of liberalism lies in its consideration of how the benefits or gains from trade give states a material incentive to avoid war, even when they have unit-level predispositions to favor it. The strength of realism is its recognition that states may be vulnerable to the potential costs of being cut off from trade on which they depend for wealth and ultimately security.Current theories, however, lack a way to fuse the benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade into one theoretical framework. More significantly, these theories lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war. Both liberalism and realism often refer to the future trading environment, particularly in empirical analyses. Bu t in constructing a theoretical logic, the two camps consider the future only within their own ideological presuppositions.Liberals, assuming that states seek to maximize absolute welfare, maintain that situations of high trade should continue into the foreseeable future as long as states are rational; such actors have no reason to forsake the benefits from trade, especially if defection from the trading arrangement will only lead to retaliation. 24 Given this presupposition, liberals can argue that interdependence-as reflected in high trade at any particular moment in time-will foster peace, given the benefits of trade over war.Realists, assuming states seek to maximize security, argue that concerns for relative power and autonomy will eventually push some states to sever trade ties (at least in the absence of a hegemon). Hence, realists can insist that interdependence, again manifest as high trade at any moment in time, drives dependent states to initiate war now to escape potenti al vulnerability later. For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism.Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a 24. See Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, appendix. EconomicInterdependence nd War | 17 a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate. Accordingly, we need a theory that incorporates how a state's expectations of its trading environment-either optimistic or pessimistic-affect its decision-calculus for war or peace. This is where the new theory makes its most significant departure.Liberalism and realism are theories of â€Å"comparative statics,† drawing predictions from a snapshot of the level of interdependence at a single point in time. The new theory, on the other hand, is dynamic in its internal structure: it provides a new variable, the â€Å"expectations o f future trade,† that incorporates in the theoretical logic an actor's sense of the future trends and possibilities. 25 This variable is essential to any leader's determination not just of the immediate value of peace versus war at a particular moment in time, but of the overall expected value of peace and war over the foreseeable future.From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a state's level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war. High interdependence can be peace-inducing, as liberals maintain, as long as states expect future trade levels to be high in the future: positive expectations for future trade will lead dependent states to assign a high expected value to a continuation of peaceful trade, making war the less appealing option.If, however, a highly dependent state expects future trade to be low due to the policy decisions of the other side, then realists are likely to be correct: the state will attach a low or even negative expected value to continued peace without trade, making war an attractive alternative if its expected value is greater than peace. Moreover, since a negative expected value of trade implies a long-term decline in power, even if war is not profitable per se, it may be chosen as the lesser of two evils. 26 5. On the differences between comparative statics and dynamic analyses that incorporate the future, see Eugene Silberberg, The Structure of Economics, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), chaps. 1, 12, and 18. 26. That is, war is rational if it has either a higher net positive value or a lower net negative value. The theory thus works regardless of whether states are innately â€Å"greedy†-seeking positive gains from war-or simply security-seekers desiring to minimize long-term threats. See Charles L.Glaser, â€Å"Political Consequences of Military Strate gy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,† WorldPolitics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. By connecting the trading environment to fears about relative decline, I draw upon the notion that declining states launch preventive wars to uphold their waning security. Elsewhere, I build a solely power-driven theory showing why states faced with deep and inevitable decline initiate major wars. Dale Copeland, â€Å"Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,† Security Studies, Vol. , No. 3 (Spring 1996). S 2 International ecurity 0:4 | 18 The deductive logic of the alternative theory, as with liberalism and realism, centers on an individual state's efforts to manage its own situation of dependence. Consider a two-actor scenario, where one state â€Å"A† may trade with another state â€Å"B. † If state A moves away from the initial position of autarchy to begin trading, and trade is free and open, it will expect to receive the benefits of trade stressed by liberals, namely, the incremental increase in A's total welfare due to trade. 7 Note that a state can still be aware of the â€Å"benefits of trade† even if present trade is non-existent, since they represent the potential gains from trade that would accrue to the state should trade levels become high in the future. 28It is a state's ability to foresee future potential benefits that allows it to attach a high expected value to the peaceful trading option even when current trade levels are low (as long as it expects current restrictions to be relaxed). When a state trades, it specializes in and exports goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage, while forgoing the production of other goods, which it then imports.This process of specialization, however, entails potentially large costs of adjustment if trade is subsequently cut off. This is especially so in the modern world if the state becomes dependen t on foreign oil and certain raw materials. With the economy's capital infrastructure (machines, factories, transportation systems, etc. ) geared to function only with such vital goods, a severing of trade would impose huge costs as the economy struggles to cope with the new no-trade situation. 29 In short, the severing of trade, as realists would argue, would put the state in a situation far worse than if it had never specialized in the first place.This analysis leads to a clearer understanding of any particular state's total level of â€Å"dependence. † On a bilateral basis, that level is represented by the sum of the benefits that the state would receive from free and open trade with another state (versus autarchy), and the costs to the state of being cut off from that trade after having specialized (versus autarchy). If state A started with an economy of 100 units of GNP before any trade with B (the autarchic position), and open trade with B would mean economic expansion to a level of 110 units of GNP on an ongoing basis, then the â€Å"benefits of trade† could be considered as 10 units.If the specialization that trade entails, however, would mean the 27. This is consistent with standard trade theory. See Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, World Tradeand Payments, 4th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1985), chaps. 3-4. 28. I thank Andrew Moravcsik for discussions on the potential benefits of trade. 29. The capital investments represent â€Å"sunk costs† not easily recouped. See Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economicsof Peacemaking,pp. 26-28. EconomicInterdependence nd War I 19 a conomy would fall to 85 units should B sever trade ties, then the â€Å"costs of severed trade† would be 15 units versus autarchy. State A's total dependence level would thus be the benefits of trade plus the costs of severed trade after specialization, or 25 units. The dependence level will itself be a function of such parameters as the overall compatibili ties of the two economies for trade, the degree of A's need for vital goods such as oil and raw materials, and the availability of alternative suppliers and markets.Thus if A's need for trade with B is great because the economies are highly compatible (say, in terms of mutual comparative advantages), B has valuable natural resources that A lacks, and A has few other countries to turn to, then A's dependence can be considered high. 30 In deciding between peace and war, however, a state can not refer simply to its dependence level. Rather, it must determine the overall expected value of trade and therefore the value of continued peace into the foreseeable future.The benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade on their own say nothing about this expected value. Dynamic expectations of future trade must be brought in. If the state has positive expectations that the other will maintain free and open trade over the long term, then the expected value of trade will be close to the valu e of the benefits of trade. On the other hand, if the state, after having specialized, comes to expect that trade will be severed by the trading partner, then the expected value of trade may be highly negative, that is, close to the value of the costs of severed trade.In essence, the expected value of trade may be anywhere between the two extremes, depending on a state's estimate of the expected probability of securing open trade, or of being cut off. 31 This leads to a crucial hypothesis. For any given expected value of war, we can predict that the lower the expectations of future trade, the lower the 30. On the importance of altematives, see Baldwin, â€Å"Interdependence and Power,† p. 482; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, . 13. It is worth remembering that alternative suppliers p nd markets are only valuable in reducing A's dependence if A can get access to them. If B is able not only to sever bilateral trade, but also to blockade A to prevent third-party tradi ng, then A effectively has no alternatives and is therefore dependent. This was the situation for Japan vis-a-vis the United States before 1941 regarding oil imports. 31. This line of reasoning is developed formally in Dale Copeland, â€Å"Modelling Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,† paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995.It is consistent with consideration of the â€Å"probability of transaction† as a determinant of expected national income in Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economicof Peacemaking,pp. 37-43, although they do not employ expectations of future trade as a theoretical variable affecting the likelihood of war. InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 20 expected value of trade, and therefore the more likely it is that war will be chosen. It is important to note that the expected value of trade will not be based on the level of trade at a particular moment in time, but u pon the stream of expected trade levels into the future.It really does not matter that trade is high today: if state A knows that B will cut all trade tomorrow and shows no signs of being willing to restore it later, the expected value of trade would be negative. Similarly, it does not matter if there is little or no trade at present: if state A is confident that B is committed to freer trade in the future, the expected value of trade would be positive. The fact that the expected value of trade can be negative even if present trade is high, due to low expectations for future trade, goes a long way towards resolving such manifest anomalies for liberal theory as German aggression in World War I.Despite high levels of trade up to 1914, German leaders had good reason to believe that the other great powers would undermine this trade into the future; hence, a war to secure control over raw materials and markets was required for the long-term security of the German nation. Since the expect ed value of trade can be positive even though present trade is low, due to high expectations for future trade, we can also understand such phenomena as the periods of detente in U. S. -Soviet relations during the Cold War (1971-73 and after 1985).While East-West trade was still relatively low during these times, the Soviet need for Western technology, combined with a growing belief that large increases in trade with the West would be forthcoming, gave the Soviets a high enough expected value of trade to convince them to be more accommodating in superpower relations. 32 In making the final decision between peace and war, however, a rational state will have to compare the expected value of trade to the expected value of going to war with the other state. The expected value of war, as a realist would emphasize, cannot be ascertained without considering the relative power balance.As one state moves from a position of relative inferiority in economic and military power to relative superi ority, the expected value of war will move from negative to positive or even highly positive. This proposition follows directly from the insights of deterrence theory: the larger the state in relative size, the higher the probability of winning a victory, while the lower the costs of fighting the war. 33 32. The U. S. -Soviet Cold War case is covered in Copeland, â€Å"Modelling Economic Interdependence and War. † 33. See Alexander L.George and Richard Smoke, Deterrencein AmericanForeign Policy: Theoryand Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chaps. 2-3. a EconomicInterdependence nd War | 21 Hence, if victory entails occupying the other state and absorbing its economy, war can take on a very positive expected value when a large power attacks a small state. 34 For example, if Iraq had been allowed to hold on to Kuwait after its August 1990 invasion, war for Iraq would certainly have â€Å"paid. † Similarly, Czechoslovakia was an easy and attractive targe t for Germany by 1938-39, as were the other smaller states of Europe, nd evidence suggests that war against these nations was indeed profitable for the Nazis. 35 On the other hand, war between more equal great powers is likely to have a much lower or even negative expected value. The Spartan leadership took Sparta into war against Athens in 431 BC, for example, under no illusions that war would be a profitable venture. 36 While the Athenian economy presented a large prize should victory be attained, war with a near-equal adversary could be expected to be very costly, with a low likelihood of victory.Where we would anticipate a low or negative expected value to the option of war, the expectations-of-future-trade variable should have a determinant effect on the likelihood of war. If state A has positive expectations for future trade with B, and A and B are roughly equal in relative power, then state A will assign a high expected value to continued peaceful trade, will compare this to the low or negative expected value for invasion, and will choose peace as the rational strategy.The higher A's dependence and the higher the expectations for future trade, the higher the expected value for peaceful trade, and therefore the more likely A is to avoid war. But if state A is dependent and has negative expectations for future trade with B, then the expected value of trade will be very low or negative. If the expected value for trade is lower than the expected value for invasion, war becomes the rational choice, and this is so even when the expected value of invasion is itself negative: war becomes the lesser of two evils. 7 34. This is developed formally in Copeland, â€Å"Modelling Economic Interdependence and War. † 35. See Peter Liberman, â€Å"Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Economies† (Ph. D. diss. , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991). 36. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War,trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), Book 1, lines 80-88. 37. When one state is very large and the other very small, it is harder to sort out the effects of interdependence from the effects of relative power, at least in actual cases of war.The expected value of war for the superior state is likely to be quite positive anyway, and thus will tend to overshadow the expected value of trade even when the state has positive expectations of future trade. Here, the superior state simply chooses war as the â€Å"greater of two goods. † This choice would not be altered by any diminution of trade expectations; indeed, war would simply be even more rational as the expected value of trade (and therefore peace) falls.War in such a situation of marked power imbalance and low expectations of future trade is thus overdetermined; it would be difficult to tell whether war occurred because of the positive expected value of war, the negative expected value of trade, or both. Thus, in my empirical analysis, I examine cases wh ere great powers InternationalSecurity 20:4 | 22 Until now, I have talked about state A's â€Å"expectations of future trade† as though they were an essentially exogenous, that is, as though state B, in its willingness to trade with A, were not affected by A's behavior.If, however, state A, by making political, military, or economic concessions, can induce B to relax trading restrictions, then A's low expectations for future trade may be raised. This suggests that the effects of diplomacy and bargaining need to be integrated into any extended historical analysis. 38 The probability of B trading with A is never completely independent of A's actions, since there is always some concession that A could make to get B to commit to higher trade levels over the long term.But the problem for A is that B's price for high trade may be unacceptable in that it undermines A's internal stability or its external power position. To take an extreme example, if B were to demand, as the price fo r higher trade, that A unilaterally disarm and allow B to occupy A with its army, it is hard to imagine A accepting such a deal. If B remains unwilling to budge from such an exorbitant demand, then it is fair to say that A's pessimistic expectation for future trade is exogenous; there is little A can do, short of national suicide, to improve the likelihood of trade.Thus state A, in estimating B's probability of trading with A, will refer to many indicators suggesting how â€Å"reasonable† B will be into the future, that is, how willing B will be to trade, and at what price. One may think of these indicators simply as causal factors affecting the variable â€Å"expectations of future trade. † Such systemic factors as B's economic competitiveness, B's rate of depletion of raw materials and energy reserves (affecting its future export ability), and military pressures constraining B's trade with A will be important.German leaders before World War I, for example, had good r eason to believe that Britain would be forced to move to imperial preference to protect its empire from the German economic challenge and to lend support to its entente partners. Japanese leaders in the late 1930s recognized that the United States would have to cut back on oil and iron exports to Japan as U. S. reserves were attacked great powers in long and costly total wars. While these cases do not cover the universe of wars, they do isolate the role of economic interdependence and changing expectations of future trade in the outbreak of war. 8. Given space constraints, my case studies in this article do not provide a full analysis of the bargaining dynamic. For an analysis of interstate economic bargaining, see Baldwin, Economic Statecraft,chap. 6; R. Harrison Wagner, â€Å"Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence,† InternationalOrganization,Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461-483. Note also that there may be a causal feedback loop, whereby in creasing fears of war lead others to reduce trade, which in turn heightens the incentive of dependent states to initiate war.These and other issues involving the endogeneity of trade expectations are addressed more fully in my book manuscript, â€Å"Economic Interdependence and War. † EconomicInterdependence nd War | 23 a depleted or needed to supply a military buildup (even one directed only at Germany). Such systemic pressures on B to reduce trade with A will foster negative expectations of future trade among A's leaders. But domestic and personal factors can also play a significant role in the exogenous rise or decline in B's likelihood of trading with A, indicating hat the assumption that B is a â€Å"unitary actor† must be relaxed to some degree when examining history. 39 In 1972, for example, the Soviets saw Nixon and Kissinger as firmly in control of American policy, and therefore able to carry through on commitments to increase East-West trade. Two years later, however, such a positive expectation for future trade could not be sustained in the wake of Watergate and the reassertion of Congressional power, at least at a price which was reasonable to the Soviets.This had much to do with the failure of detente, as I argue elsewhere. 40 A comparison of the arguments of trade expectations theory with those of liberal and realist theory is presented in Table 1. To summarize: liberals contend that high economic dependence, as manifest in high trade levels, reduces a state's likelihood of initiating war by providing a material â€Å"constraint† on unit-level forces for aggression. Low dependence will increase this likelihood, since this constraint on unit-level motives for war is removed.Realists argue that high dependence heightens the probability of war as dependent states struggle to reduce their vulnerability. In the realist world, however, low dependence should have no impact on the likelihood of war or peace; that is, other factors sh ould become causally determinant of war. Still, since economic interdependence is at least eliminated as a possible source of conflict, realists 39. Note that state A, the decision-making unit in the theory, can still be treated as a rational unitary actor respondingto the observed domestic forces on the other side. 0. See Copeland, â€Å"Modeling Economic Interdependence and War,†pp. 62-66. International trade institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by lowering transaction costs and facilitating the punishment of cheaters, may be an additional means to build positive expectations for future trade. Indeed, for some liberals, peace may only be likely when both interdependence and effective global institutions co-exist and reinforce one another; Keohane, â€Å"International Liberalism Reconsidered,† p. 183.While such institutions may indeed affect trade expectations, they are unlikely to be as significant in history as the systemic and dom estic factors just discussed, for the simple reason that these institutions are a creation of the post-World War II era. Moreover, since concerns for war and peace revolve mostly around the great powers, and powers like Soviet Union and China have been historically excluded from trade institutions like GATT, such institutions cannot account for fluctuations in the levels of tension between the United States and these powers since 1945.Finally, the institutional approach overlooks bilateraldiplomacy as the principal mechanism through which expectations of trade change; consider the United States and Japan up to December 1941, or the United States and Japan today. Accordingly, while my argument recognizes the contribution institutions can make to the improvement of future trade expectations, the focus both theoretically and empirically remains fundamentally non-institutional. 2 S International ecurity 0:4 | 24 4– C/) CO D C o C CD co -0 Co 0 0 0 C CO N E cn C 0 0 -;– a) co C 0 +-, w CM> C0 w n E C < CD+M † 1 CD CD :3 C> CO C CD 0 :3 +, -0 0 m W W cn CD4- ‘a cn 0 c: c CD 0 D- 0 m N C C: >W CD CD cn E +, an c 0 +. ,cn Cn CO CD 0 u – :3 0 -0 CC CD a CD 0 Co 0 0 0 +, cn co co o co co CL 0 C < CD :3 >- C-D C W 0 co E cD w C co > C Ew CD C C > CD E E0 CD C 0) Cn CD >- > 77 cn 0 CD 0 CD E C -C W CD -0 +, C cn 0 CD CD Cn a ‘. 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Challenges of special needs education Essay

Efforts involved in implementation of Special needs education in Uganda today have got challenges that are facing them. These challenges are Handling the problems of an inclusive classroom. The concept of having classrooms that contain both special needs students and students who are developing typically is becoming a popular one. This type of education poses new challenges for a special education teacher. For example, many students who have no disabilities are unaccustomed to dealing with those who do. Teachers in these classes are charged with eliminating cruelty and insensitivity from among  their students and ensuring that those with special needs are treated with respect. Professional Isolation. The nature of a special education teacher’s work is very different from that of traditional teachers; the result of this is that standard classroom teachers may not view them as colleagues. There may be a professional stigma attached to the work of teaching â€Å"slow† students. Special education teachers often work with smaller groups and may focus on skills rather than content, thereby leading to the perception that their work is easier or less important. Lack of support from parents. Some parents of special needs children are disinterested in the welfare of their children and fail to provide them with adequate care. Alternatively, they may be overly protective. Both can be problematic for the child and for their teacher. Disinterested parents may have no involvement with their child’s education or interaction with their teachers, WHEREAS OVERPROTECTIVE PARENTS MAY HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS FROM THE CHILD AND THE CHILD’S teachers. Both attitudes can shape children in negative ways. Parental disinterest may make special needs students less motivated and parents who are overprotective often diminish their  child’s confidence and make it harder for them to learn. 2 otydally@gmail. com The difficulty of discipline in a special needs classroom. Disabled children may have behavioral issues including restlessness and moodiness. They may also exhibit problems like a short attention span or an inability to understand what is being taught. Special education teachers have to learn how to deal with these problems as well as how to take appropriate disciplinary measures. Budget problems. Across the nation, special education programs are facing increasing enrollment and decreasing budgets. The result is that there are fewer teacher assistants available, which results in a greater workload for special education teachers. They may also face shortages of essential resources and equipment for delivering effective lessons. Shortage of teachers to handle learners with special needs. Most of the teachers refuse to offer a hand once told to handle a class and later identify that learners in that class are disabled in one way or the other. Many teachers like to teach only learners who are able to do things without any difficulty. They fail to understand that ability is not to everyone. Shortage of teaching materials. Some schools in Uganda today support the learners with special needs but they are faced with a problem of the materials they are to use to teach the learners for example having brails for the blind. This poses a challenge to special needs education in Uganda today. Statistics about the number of the children with special needs. There is no correct statistical approximation of the number of the children with special needs in Uganda today. Supplemented by the enumeration of people taking place after a long period. With miss appropriated number of  children with special needs, there comes a challenge to the state to budget for them in terms of the resources like human resource available. 3 otydally@gmail. com Rigid curriculum. Rigidity of the curriculum is also a challenge as it does not clearly show how to handle people with disabilities. The curriculum provides the content but not the pedagogy. This poses achallenge to the teachers who handle learners with special needs on how to handle and present or deliver the content. There are few schools that offer special needs education in Uganda today. They are faced with  a problem of handling the whole multitude of learners all over the country. The population of learners in those schools is high becoming a challenge to teaching and special needs education in general. There are few training institutions for those who would wish to understand the necessary basics of handling learners with disabilities. Assumptions tend to be taken that it is automatic that an individual cannot fail to handle a person with any form of disability. This is a real misconception as for example a person may just think that he knows but when a disabled person asks him for some help, he directs him to specialists. Despite the fact that Special needs education is faced with a number of challenges. Some of those challenges can be mitigated. I suggest the following ways that can be used to act as solutions t the number of challenges above are:- Comprehensive review of state laws, regulations and policies should be done to in cooperate policies for efficient implementation of special needs education in Uganda today. In addition government policies should be put in place with clearly well-defined measures to the rights of the disabled and what is expected from the community as far as providing special needs education is concerned. This will enable the learners to be helped in whatever form the help may be but not being isolated and thus their presence in society thought of as being useless. 4 otydally@gmail. com Tertiary institutions that train teachers should in cooperate into their curriculum courses that train teachers to handle learners with special needs. This will help increase the human resource that handle learners with special needs eliminating the challenge of the shortage of teachers with skills of handling learners with special needs. Sensitization of stake holders of their roles regarding the support they should render to people  with disabilities. This will make parents not to keep their children at home rather send them to schools where they may be fully partially included in regular classes thus will end up having achieved their right to education. Parents should made aware of the consequences of not rendering a hand in the education of their children. The government should consider the special needs education sector on their budget. This will make them cater for the materials that the students need to learn. With these materials like the brails available, the implementation of education of learners with special needs will not have  much trouble. Review of the curriculum to check where people with various forms of disabilities can be infused into the system needs to be done as this will help teachers have at least some basics of handling the disabled not leaving everything tothose whom they claim to be experts inthat field. With maximum cooperation of teachers in the school, all the students will thus be catered for. REFERENCES Fanning, B. , Veale, A. , & O’Connor, D. (2001). Beyond the pale: Asylum seeking children and social exclusion in Ireland. Dublin: Irish Refugee Council. Farrell, P. (1997). The integration of children with severe learning difficulties: A review of the recent literature. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 50(2), 26-31 Ferguson, D. L. (2008). International trends in inclusive education: The continuing challenge to teach each one and everyone. European Journal of Special Needs Education, 23(2), 109-120 Gutman, L. M. , & Midgley, C. (2000). The role of protective factors in supporting the academic achievement of poor African American students during the middle school transition. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 29(2), 223-248.

The Worst Storm in Canadian History

Ice storms, also referred to as glaze storms, cause considerable damage every year to trees in urban and natural areas. They vary considerably in their severity and frequency. Ice storms are result of the ice formation process, which is influenced by general weather patterns. Ice accumulates when super cooled rain freezes on contact with surfaces, such as tree branches, that are at or below the freezing point (0'C). This generally occurs when a winter warm front passes through an area after the ground-level temperature reaches or falls below freezing. Rain falls through layers of cooler air without freezing, becoming super cooled. Periodically, other climatic events, including stationary, occluded, and cold fronts, also result in ice storms. The purpose of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the1998 ice storm. This paper features three main section: An introduction, the main body (damage to woodland), and finally, a conclusion. In the main body of this paper, the effect of fire and pest/disease is discussed in detail. In the conclusion, comparison is made between fire and pests/disease versus ice storm. By the end of this paper, one should gain a better understanding of the severity of the 1998 ice storm as well as other damaging agents that affect the woodland in eastern North America Ice storms are often winter's worst hazard. More slippery than snow, freezing rain or glaze is tough and tenacious, clinging to every object it touches. A little can be dangerous, a lot can be catastrophic. Ice storm in Northeastern America has been common but the 1998 ice storm was exceptional. Ice storms are a major hazard in all parts of Canada except the North, but are especially common from Ontario to Newfoundland. The severity of ice storms depends largely on the accumulation of ice, the duration of the event, and the location and extent of the area affected. Based on these criteria, Ice Storm'98 was the worst ever to hit Canada in recent memory. From January 5-10, 1998 the total water equivalent of precipitation, comprising mostly freezing rain and ice pellets and a bit of snow, exceeded 85 mm in Ottawa, 73 mm in Kingston, 108 in Cornwall and 100 mm in Montreal (Environmental Canada, Jan 12/1998). Previous major ice storms in the region, notably December 1986 in Ottawa and February 1961 in Montreal, deposited between 30 and 40 mm of ice – about half the thickness from the 1998 storm event! (Environmental Canada, Jan 12/1998). The extent of the area affected by the ice was enormous. Freezing precipitation is often described as â€Å"a line of† or â€Å"spotty occurrences of†. At the peak of the storm, the area of freezing precipitation extended from Muskoka and Kitchener in Ontario through eastern Ontario, western Quebec and the Eastern Townships to the Fundy coasts of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. What made the ice storm so unusual, though, was that it went on for so long. On average, Ottawa and Montreal receive freezing precipitation on 12 to 17 days a year. Each episode generally lasts for only a few hours at a time, for an annual average total between 45 to 65 hours. During Ice Storm'98, it did not rain continuously, however, the number of hours of freezing rain and drizzle was in excess of 80 – again nearly double the normal annual total. One of the most appealing features of Eastern Ontario is the extensive forest cover. This is made up of woodlands of varying structure. These woodlands, as well as natural fencerows, windbreaks, and plantations of pine and poplar, dominate the landscape. Icing impacts may best be understood by treating spatially larger scales, starting with individual trees, proceeding to stands, and finally to forest landscapes. Ice damage to trees can range from mere breakage of a few twigs, to bending stems to the ground, to moderate crown loss, to outright breakage of the trunk. In the 1998 Northeastern ice storm, icing lasted long enough that many trees which were bent over had their crowns glued to the snow surface by the ice in many instances for as long as 3 weeks. Some of those trees actually erect posture after release from the snow, while many others remain bent over after 2 years. The severity of damage is generally believed to be closely related to the severity of winds following the heaviest ice accumulations. Damage varies across a range of severity and subtlety: minor branch breakage; major branch loss; bending over of crowns; root damages; breakage of trunks and in some hardwoods, trunks can be split. Depending on the stand composition, the amount of ice accumulation, and the stand history, damage to stands can range from light and patchy to the total breakage of all mature stems. Complete flattening of stands occurred locally in the Northeaster 1998 storm. In response to more moderate damage, effects on stands could include: shifts in over story composition in favor of the most resistant trees; loss of stand growth until leaf area is restored; and loss of value of the growth due to staining or damage to stem form. The term landscape refers to a ‘group† or a ‘family† of trees. I use the term vaguely because the size and composition of landscapes differ from region to region. The degree of damage is typically highly skewed by area. For example, in the January 1998 Northeaster storm, 1,800,000 ha of damage in Quebec was assessed by the Ministry of Natural Resource: very severe 4.2%, severe 32.0%, moderate 29.9%, and slight/trace 33.9% (The Science of the Total Environment, Volume: 262, Issue: 3, November 15, 2000, pp. 231-242 ). The effects on entire forest landscapes are highly patchy and variable. They also depend significantly on how landowners respond to the damage. Disturbance caused by diseases, by themselves or in conjunction with disturbance by insects, abiotic factors such as drought, fire and wind, and, increasingly, human activities, has played a critical role in the dynamics of many forest ecosystems in North America. In the predominantly coniferous forests in western North America there are considerable areas undisturbed directly by human activities. In these areas, diseases kill trees or predispose them to other agents of disturbance, resulting in gradual change in stand composition and structure. In areas disturbed by forest management practices of harvesting or exclusion of fire, increased disease incidence and severity has increased the damage caused by disease, and consequently, the rate of change. In the absence of introduced diseases in the predominantly deciduous forests of the Appalachian region of eastern North America, forests are relatively healthy. Here, forests are disturbed significantly by disease only after they are disturbed or stressed by other agents, predominantly defoliating insects and drought. In the eastern montane coniferous forest, chronic wind damage is a major predisposing factor to disease. Past harvesting practices, introduced diseases and insects, and fire exclusion have in some instances resulted in large areas of similar species and relatively similar ages that exacerbate the magnitude and severity of disturbance by disease. Fire is predominantly a natural phenomenon that burns the forest vegetation, polluting the ozone and wiping out the biodiversity. One major distinction between ice storm and forest fire is the way disaster are caused. The majority of forest fire could arguably be a result of human action and ice storm as an ‘act of god,† an act that is out of human control. Foresters usually distinguish three types of forest fires: ground fires, which burn the humus layer of the forest floor but do not burn appreciably above the surface; surface fires, which burn forest undergrowth and surface litter; and crown fires, which advance through the tops of trees or shrubs. It is not uncommon for two or three types of fires to occur simultaneously. Forest management has been able to reduce the occurrence of this event but many forest fires are out of arm†s length. Humans cause the majority of forest fires. Campers that do not put out their bond fire or campers littering lit cigarette bud are responsible for such an action. Natural occurrence such as lightning could spark a forest fire but the probability is small compared to human action. The convention way of putting out or reducing the spread of forest fire has been airliners. These airliners are filled with gallons and galloons of water. With limited capacity, these airliners fly above the flame and deposit galloons of water. For the purpose of this paper, deforestation simply means the lost of trees where the lost of trees exceeds the level of sustainable development. One of the major effects of forest fire is the burning of carbon dioxide into our atmosphere. This eventually creates a greenhouse affect and global warming. The effect damages our ecosystem as well as reduces one of Canada†s precious natural resource. Many projects, both from government funding and corporate sponsors, have done a good job increasing the awareness and risk related to deforestation. Pests directly affect the quantity and quality of forest nursery seedlings and can indirectly cause losses by disrupting reforestation plans or reducing survival of out planted stock. The movement of infested stock can disseminate pests to new areas. Since control of nursery pests may be based on pesticide usage, pest outbreaks may lead to environmental contamination. Woodland damage caused by livestock is a well-documented, yet persistent, forest health problem. Soil compaction, root disturbance and trunk/root collar damage caused by livestock reduce the vigor of trees. This paves the way for armillaria root rot, borers and other opportunistic organisms. Livestock also destroy the forest under story (reproduction), which hastens soil erosion and limits the future productivity of the site. The resulting forest decline reduces the quality, value and longevity of current and future trees on the site. Eliminating livestock from woodlands is the first step toward a healthier, more productive forest. As mentioned earlier in this paper, ice storm is a natural phenomenon caused by nature whereas forest fire are a result of human actions and preventable. One of the major differences between fire and ice storm is the rate of damage. Forest fire has a direct impact on the woodlands by changing the diversity of the landscape. Forest fire wipes out an entire landscape of trees causing a release of carbon dioxide. This ‘in lieu† effect results in global warming as well as greenhouse effect. The release of carbon dioxide has a long-term effect to our ecosystem. Carbon dioxide is trapped in our ozone layer making airways less preamble. This trapping effect eventually radiates heat causing global warming. The long-term effect is hazardous and changes our biodiversity. Ice storm has very little affect to our ozone layer. Damage to woodlands as a result of ice storm is concentrated within that area. Ice storm does not spread like fire does so areas that have been hit by an ice storm affect woodlands Pests and disease slowly eroded the quantity as well as quality of woodland. Infected woodland slows the development of growth by eroding the soil limiting the production of trees. Pest control and good forest management could improve the quality and well as productivity in these areas. Pests and diseases cause a slow change in biodiversity. As the woodland become infested, animals feeding from leafs and branch find it less desirable, eventually leaving the area in search of more suitable woodland. Similarly, forest fire, pests and disease spread but at a much slower rate. These agents infect the trees, eventually penetrating the roots and moving on to the next host. As mentioned previous, ice storm does not spread, rather the effect stays within the area. To conclude, fire and pests/disease are similar in the way these agents spread and infect their host. The preceding sentence can be best thought of as a virus infected it†s host as an analogy. Fire spreads at a much faster rate than pests/disease and the impact are instant. Both of these agents have long-term effect, which does not work in our favor. Ice storm affects the area it hits and will not spread. Furthermore, ice storms are predictable whereas fire is not since the cause of fire is human mistake and is hard to predict. Ice storms are not preventable but human actions can be prevented. The potential of damage from fire is far more severe than that of ice storm. We must increase the awareness to ensure that our woodland remains healthy and protect our ecosystem.